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Abstract
This article involves a conceptual evaluation of a large-scale innovation policy experiment—so-called
smart specialization strategies (S3s)—that took place within the framework of the European regional
cohesion programs between 2011 and the present. The goal is to provide a collection of reflections
offering a wealth of lessons and information regarding the capacity of regional governmental
agencies and other actors involved in the innovation system to implement a mission-oriented re-
search and development support program and regarding the institutional and cultural conditions that
can facilitate its practical application. In the first section, I briefly review the fundamentals of S3s. In
the second section, I propose a framework for the identification of mission-oriented policies and I ex-
plain how S3 fits into this category. The following section shows how this policy represents a break
with the policies that have long dominated the regional policy landscape. The fourth section describes
the designing of this policy whose objective is to make strategic choices and decentralization of infor-
mation and initiatives compatible. And finally, the last section reports on the emerging institutional
forms that seem to facilitate the putting into practice of this design.
JEL classification: O25, O31, O38
This article may be considered as a conceptual evaluation of a large-scale innovation policy experiment that took
place within the framework of the European regional cohesion programs between 2011 and the present.1 In the pos-
ition of privileged observer-contributor, and taking into account the fact that systematic evaluations of the effects of
this policy will not be carried out for several years, I think I am able able to provide a collection of reflections offering
a wealth of lessons and information regarding the capacity of regional governmental agencies and other actors
involved in the innovation system to implement a mission-oriented R&D support program (abbreviated as mission-
oriented policy [MOP]) and regarding the institutional and cultural conditions that can facilitate its practical
application.
1 Having been at the origin of the S3 concept, with Bart Van Ark, Paul A. David, and Bronwyn Hall, then deeply involved in
putting the recommendations resulting from this approach into practice, I have greatly contributed to developing the de-
sign of this policy at a theoretical level, to the translation of this design in terms of policy practices intended for regional
agencies, and finally to the concrete shaping of the “institutions” conceived for implementing these practices.
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In the first section, I briefly review the fundamentals of smart specialization strategies (S3s). In the second section,
I propose a framework for the identification of MOPs and I explain how S3 fits into this category. The following sec-
tion shows how this policy represents a break with the policies that have long dominated the regional policy land-
scape. The fourth section describes the designing of this policy whose objective is to make strategic choices and
decentralization of information and initiatives compatible. And finally, the last section reports on the emerging insti-
tutional forms that seem to facilitate the putting into practice of this design.
1. Smart specialization strategies: a primer
1.1 S3 as a key instrument for European Union regional policy
One question that has been repeatedly addressed for the past 20 years in regional policy discussions is whether
there is a better alternative to a policy that spreads research and development (R&D) investments thinly across sev-
eral frontier technology and research fields, and as a consequence fails to make much of an impact in any one area.
A more promising strategy appears to be to encourage investment in programs that will complement the country’s
other productive assets to create future domestic capability and interregional competitive advantage. We had
termed this strategy “smart specialization” (Foray et al., 2009; Foray, 2015). Smart specialization is expected to
create more diversity among regions than a regime in which each region tries to create more or less the same in an
imitative manner. The latter would almost certainly result in excess duplication of R&D and educational invest-
ment programs, which in turn would diminish the potential for complementarities within the European knowledge
base (Foray et al., 2009).
Based on our article (Foray et al., 2009), the smart specialization approach was integrated into the reformed cohe-
sion policy for 2014–2020. Member states and regions have developed over 120 S3s, establishing priorities for re-
search and innovation investments for the 2014–2020 period. Throughout this period, more than EUR 40 billion
(and more than EUR 65 billion including national co-financing) allocated to regions via the European Regional
Development Fund will fund these priorities (European Commission, 2017).
To ensure the application and diffusion of the S3 approach across regions in Europe, S3s need to be in place (“ex-
ante conditionality”) before receiving the financial support of the European Regional Development Fund on research
and innovation in the 2014–2020 period.
Moreover, to support the process, the Commission set up an S3 platform, which, since 2011, advises regional
authorities on how to design and implement their S3.
1.2 From the formation of transformative activities to structural changes
The concept of smart specialization describes a process. A process aimed at transforming the economic structures of
a region or any other geographical unit through the formation and development of new transformative activities.
Transformative activity is a key concept. It is neither an individual project nor a sector as a whole but rather a collec-
tion of innovation capacities and actions, that have been “extracted” as it were from an existing structure or several
structures, to which can be added extra-regional capacities and that is oriented toward a certain structural change.
The following case will help readers understand the notion of a transformative activity leading to structural
change. This concerns the footwear industry in Northern Portugal, which has undergone profound renewal in a con-
text of frantic global competition. The strategy implemented by the public innovation agency involved the formation
of an activity aimed at the development of new forms of flexible automation in the footwear industry. The goal was
to achieve the integration of engineering knowledge from the University of Porto (INESC); skills of companies
specialized in industrial machinery, tools, and software; as well as the entrepreneurial vision of a few footwear-
manufacturing firms that had a good understanding of the urgent need for revival via innovation. The integration of
this knowledge facilitated the exploration of the potential for automation associated with advanced cutting tools to
increase the flexibility and quality of production. Economic experimentation with these technological developments
resulted in a new business model based on an increase in the variety of designs and the capacity to rapidly respond to
small orders. This development has led one segment of the footwear industry in Northern Portugal to bypass global
competition and become the second most important European producer in terms of exports and added value
(Agencia de Inovac¸ao, 2012).
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In this case, the starting point is an existing structure, the transitional path is the formation and development of a
transformative activity, and the objective is a structural change (here the modernization of a traditional sector). We
also observe that the transformative activity does not necessarily concern the whole sector but a group of companies,
suppliers, and research partners that are prepared to embark upon some forms of collective action to transform their
capacities.
A transformative activity concentrates the necessary actions—R&D projects, partnerships, and supply of new spe-
cific public goods—to explore the new area of opportunity and facilitate the implementation of collective actions be-
tween the different innovation actors concerned. The basic operational mode is not necessarily the collaborative
project but the search for coordination and links between the entities and projects concerned, which will facilitate
spillovers, economies of variety and scale, and the supply of specific public goods and infrastructures to the domain
in question.
In some cases, the development of a new transformative activity can occur in a spontaneous and decentralized
way, with great success. It is triggered by entrepreneurial capabilities as well as the manager’s understanding and vi-
sion that collective or coordinated actions can boost innovation and profitability (Ghemawat, 2017). Such develop-
ment is likely to generate knowledge spillovers and stimulate the entry and agglomeration of firms around the new
activity. There are many smart specialization stories that were successful without any policy.
But in many cases, entrepreneurial and management capabilities are too weak, or perhaps the challenges of devel-
oping a new transformative activity to explore new combinations between capacities and opportunities through
some kind of collective actions are too great, and the processes described earlier will not happen, at least not in a
spontaneous way. A policy is required to help identify a transformative activity that is needed to trigger a structural
change and support the growth of such activity.
Based on these definitions, designing a S3 means identifying a small number of transformative activities, which
will be developed and supported. This portfolio of activities is managed at a regional level and possibly modified as
new opportunities for structural change arise.
1.3 Differentiation and specialization
In identifying and supporting new transformative activities, regions can address a dual problem—that of differenti-
ation and specialization of their innovation capacities—that is generally poorly dealt with by standard innovation
policies.
1.3.1 Differentiation
Each region is different with regard to its history, relative specializations, and socioeconomic, geographic, and demo-
graphic conditions. These differences imply that each region can be characterized by specific capacities, needs, and
opportunities concerning research and innovation that cannot be completely fulfilled within the framework of undif-
ferentiated policies, which are limited to the provision of aggregate and generic capacities. Each region is therefore
invited to particularize itself by identifying some new key domains to explore new combinations between capacities
and opportunities and in which regional innovation capacity must be established or strengthened.
1.3.2 Specialization
This logic of differentiation necessarily implies certain forms of specialization. We have already highlighted that such
a policy involves addressing specific capabilities and infrastructures, and a regional government whose governance
capacities are, by definition, limited will not be able to achieve this for all sectors. Choices must be made.
Furthermore, essential determinants of the productivity of activities dedicated to innovation are scale, critical mass,
and a sufficient agglomeration of actors. It is problems of indivisibility and methods of circulating and recombining
ideas and knowledge that give large-scale systems—for example, urban centers—an indisputable comparative advan-
tage when it comes to innovation. Thus, each region will be well advised to possess some kind of critical masses of in-
novation actors, but here too a medium-sized region will be unable to obtain them everywhere.2 Again, choices must
be made.
2 Critical mass is a relative measure. The absolute amount of resources that need to be invested to boost innovation
depends on many factors that are specific to the technological field or industry involved (Trajtenberg, 2002). In some
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In many cases, regional policies fail to boost innovation and structural changes because they promote
specialization without differentiation or differentiation without specialization. The former involves the promotion of
a cluster (specialization) that does not reflect any regional-specific strengths or potentials. Such a policy could be
labeled “another biotech cluster,” reflecting the tendency of regions to try to specialize in the same high technologies.
The “another biotech cluster” policy has been the result of undifferentiated recommendations regarding best policy
practices encouraging policymakers to set their sights on doing the same good things to foster the same forms of
innovation.
The latter case involves subsidizing an isolated project, which is disconnected from the existing product space of
the regional economy. Such a policy could be labeled “I subsidize your drone R&D project although it is not related
to any other R&D activity in the region.” The absence of local connections and potential agglomeration will make
the public funding of such a project a very risky venture (the project is either likely to fail or, if successful, to move to
a place where it will benefit from better connections and relations with the environment).
Contrasting with these incoherent policies, two other logics provide a better understanding of what should be sup-
ported and promoted to boost innovation and structural change at a regional level: policies with neither a goal of dif-
ferentiation nor a goal of specialization are the standard and horizontal policies that are of course very useful for
building generic capacities and improving framework conditions. Policies pursuing both goals of differentiation and
specialization express the idea of smart specialization in which the two goals are characterized by strategic comple-
mentarities: the social benefits of achieving one goal increase when the other goal is also achieved.
1.4 The centrality of the priority identification process
John Enos wrote very pertinently—long before the era of smart specialization—that it is useful and productive for
regions to put more effort into discovering and choosing, in detail and for the future, priority areas for R&D and in-
novation (Enos, 1995). There are two reasons for devoting more effort to specifying what are likely to be and what
are not fruitful priority areas. The negative reason is that if regions do not specify, global players will; the positive
reason is that the knowledge and experience acquired from discovering and choosing the right directions for R&D
and innovation can be valuable in carrying out the subsequent stages of product/process/market design, production,
and distribution.
The idea is therefore that the process by which priorities and transformative activities can be identified is not a
process on which resources must be economized or that should be speeded up at all costs. Neither is it a process that
should be “confiscated” by the government. But it is a process of learning about the capacities and opportunities spe-
cific to the region’s economy that is useful and productive. And as such, it lies at the very heart of S3.
1.5 S3: addressing specific capabilities and specific coordination problems
S3 is characterized by a key fact, which is that it has to address specific problems and needs, according to the technol-
ogy or sector considered. Indeed, the construction or development of a transformative activity specific to a sector or
technology entails the provision of innovation services and infrastructures that are themselves specific to this domain
and the fulfilment of needs for coordination between actors that are also specific. This is essentially because innov-
ation requires not only general framework conditions and aggregate capacities—the basics have to be right—but also
capabilities and infrastructures that are specific (not generic) to the domains, sectors, or technologies to which the in-
novation is related.
Supporting biotechnology development for fisheries will require the provision of capabilities in terms of research,
suppliers, and services very different from those required to support the development of advanced manufacturing
technologies for the footwear industry or to support the development of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) for tourism. Each transformative activity thus in fact corresponds to a particular policy. Such a
policy has to deal with the complexity and specificity of each activity and this has a cost. This is haute couture rather
than ready-to-wear. A policy such as R&D tax credit is ready-to-wear (it has a cost but is relatively easy to imple-
ment), whereas providing the specific capabilities for a specific emerging activity is haute couture and therefore more
costly still.
cases, the amount of resources is likely to be huge (and thus not attainable by any medium-sized region). In other cases,
this amount of resources is not “big,” as for instance in regions specialized in the co-invention of ICT applications for a
specific sector (see next endnote).
820 D. Foray
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/icc/article-abstract/27/5/817/5091000 by U
niversite and EPFL Lausanne user on 18 M
arch 2019
But according to Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), it is unavoidable. Innovation policy cannot be limited to the pro-
vision of generic capabilities and infrastructures: “The idea that a Government can disengage from specific policies
and just focus on general framework conditions in a sector neutral way is an illusion based on the disregard for the
specificity and complexity of the requisite publicly provided inputs and capabilities in specific domains.”
1.6 Three qualifications
We must now present three qualifications to avoid certain incorrect interpretations of this approach.
First, the logic of smart specialization does not mean that “all the rest” should be neglected. The most generic and
horizontal policies naturally remain essential, and smart specialization becomes an additional option that regions are
well advised to activate if they are capable of setting up an intelligent process of identification of priorities (i.e., trans-
formative activities) and development of these activities.
Second, the logic of regional differentiation of innovation capacities, needs, and opportunities at a regional level
necessarily implies that the reality of innovation is not reduced to high-tech and cutting-edge research. Innovation is
widely distributed over the whole spectrum of sectors (not just high tech) and invention processes (not only formal
R&D). For many regions, the point is not inventing at the frontier but rather generating innovation complementar-
ities in existing sectors. These types of complementarities are perhaps less exciting and flamboyant, but they ultimate-
ly represent the key to economy-wide growth in regional economies. This means that a transformative activity,
depending on what the objective of transformation is, can involve actions like training programs, the formation of
new managerial and engineering skills, quality control and certification processes, as well as technology adoption—
all these actions are perhaps less ostentatious than supporting high-tech start-ups but are the components of a coher-
ent and full-fledged transformative activity aimed at profoundly transforming the structures of traditional
industries.3
Third, the identification and support of transformative activities do not mean that the aim of S3 is a closed econ-
omy or regional autarky. The strategy is open. It must take into account and be based on existing potential, part of
which, in each region, is composed of international investments and segments of internationalized value chains. It
must also seek critical resources and knowledge outside the region that are not available at home.
2. Why talk about MOPs in connection with S3?
It is not easy to distinguish from the mass of policies devoted to research and innovation a clearly defined subsection,
which could comprise such diverse MOPs as exploring Mars, reducing poverty, stabilizing the climate, discovering a
new vaccine, or modernizing the agro-food sector in Lombardy! And yet it certainly seems that there is a “mission”
entrusted to each of these programs.
It is indeed difficult to try and define this category by the nature of the missions that would be assigned to these
policies. There is an extremely wide variety of possible missions—in terms of functional objectives and of the level of
aggregation or granularity at which these missions are identified—as many missions all interlock. It is thus helpful to
try to identify what characterizes MOPs in a more analytical fashion and we have chosen the resource allocation
framework that prevails in the case of these MOPs.
First, the MOP is distinguished by its non-neutral nature, in other words a principle of preferential intervention.
This logic of non-neutrality means there is a predetermination of a technological domain, sector, or class of economic
agents that are specifically targeted by the intervention in question. In contrast, a sector-neutral (horizontal) policy is
3 The specific properties of general purpose technologies (GPTs) play an important role in helping secondary regions to
combine their existing capacities with new opportunities (Bresnahan, 2010). Central features of a GPT are horizontal
propagation throughout the economy and complementarity between the invention of the GPT and the development of
applications that are related to specific sectors. Moreover, the dynamics of a GPT may be spatially distributed between
regions specialized in basic inventions and regions investing in specific application domains that are related to existing
structures. Although a few leading regions can invest in the invention of a GPT or the combination of different GPTs
(such as bioinformatics), follower regions and laggards are often better advised to invest in the co-invention of
applications, i.e., the development of the applications of a GPT in one or several important domains of the regional
economy.
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a policy that addresses problems that are similar to those of any company and other innovation actors across sectors
and fields. Such a neutral policy aims at improving general conditions and fixing generic problems, while avoiding
any preferential interventions, thus minimizing the risks of distortions and government failures. The problem is that
there are in fact very few perfectly neutral policies, as expressed so well by Rodrik (2007), who speaks of “limiting
case more than a clear-cut alternative to sectoral policies.” For example, R&D tax credit—often considered the pana-
cea of neutral innovation policies—is actually an intervention in favor of companies doing research. Purely neutral
policies would therefore more accurately be those that do not directly concern innovation but concern more generally
generic capacities and institutions, which form the innovation framework—human capital, functioning of the differ-
ent factor and product markets, macroeconomic environment, as well as the generic capacities and institutions that
form the essential components of an innovation system (university, intellectual property, bank, etc.), even if the neu-
trality of each of these institutions—in other words, their general validity—is never absolute.
As most innovation policies are thus non-neutral, we need a second criterion in terms of allocative logic to pin-
point more precisely what constitutes the specificity of MOPs. This second criterion is based on the idea that innov-
ation policy can either influence the rate of innovation without being concerned about the domains where a higher
rate would be desirable or it attempts to influence the direction of innovation.
By direction, we are not referring here to the theory of the induced technical change—according to which the direc-
tion of technical progress varies as a function of relative price changes—as direction in this case expresses simply factor-
saving logics (labor-, capital-, and energy-saving). When we talk of direction here, we mean rather the fact of aiming at
certain technological, social, environmental, or industrial objectives, which entails targeting specific domains—whether
industrial or technological—and the actors connected with them (see also Mazzucato in this issue).
Thus, a non-neutral policy that is limited to influencing the rate of innovation will focus on general categories—
activities (R&D) or actors (Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)) —regardless of their sectoral or technological af-
filiation. A non-neutral policy focusing on innovation rates will create a kind of cross section in the innovation sys-
tem to target a predefined category—SMEs, firms doing research, etc. For example, the Small Business Innovation
and Research Program (SBIR), an American program primarily intended for small firms, like the R&D tax credit, are
non-neutral policies focusing exclusively on the rate of innovation.
A policy focusing on the direction of innovation is, by definition, non-neutral. But also, it is characterized by
objectives that go beyond the simple fact of offering preferential assistance to a certain category of actors. It is
designed according to specific technological, industrial, social, or environmental objectives, whose fulfilment requires
clusters of innovations oriented in the appropriate direction. Whether they are aimed at exploring Mars, reducing
obesity problems, or modernizing a particular traditional industry, these policies will obey the same principles of
non-neutrality of interventions and direction of innovation. These principles form the basis of the MOP concept.
Below we represent, in a tree diagram (Figure 1), a classification of innovation policies according to allocative logics
(neutrality or non-neutrality, rate or direction).
The advantage of this taxonomy is especially to show that all non-neutral policies are not MOPs. There is in par-
ticular a class of non-neutral policies that exclusively target the rate of innovation (center sphere) that are relatively
easy to implement, as they focus on the resolution of “standard” problems, the category of actors targeted is simple
to define, the policy instruments are relatively easy to use, and the program administration costs are relatively low.
A significant difference within non-neutral policies between those that target simply a category of actors or activ-
ities (center sphere) and those that focus on certain technological or other objectives (left sphere) is that the latter in-
evitably have a systemic character (David, 1993). They must indeed address questions of complementarities between
different types of capacities, coordination between actors and between investments, or connection between innov-
ation and diffusion. All these problems are only weakly addressed by a policy that focuses on only one particular cat-
egory of agent or activity.4
Policies that are non-neutral and target the direction of innovation—MOPs—are marked by a higher degree of in-
tentionality and prioritization. The predetermination of the targeted objectives and domains is no easy matter; it
4 David (1993) distinguishes between the stage model of innovation policy (which tends to characterize the policies in the
central sphere that focus on certain stages or certain actors of the innovation process) and the systems model of innov-
ation policy that recognizes the importance of questions of complementarity, coordination, and connection between in-
novation and diffusion and thus characterizes MOPs. We should note that the system approach is also prevalent in the
right sphere of Figure 1 but as a complement to a neutral resource allocation logic.
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requires the setting up of complex strategic choice processes. Furthermore, the degree of specificity of interventions is
higher than in the other two policy categories. Indeed it is specific problems of complementarity and coordination
that have to be addressed—the level and quality of the information required are often out of the range of government
or public agency (we will return to this very important point in Section 3). The instruments necessary for interven-
tions are not standard and will vary according to the objectives, sectors, or technologies concerned. The administra-
tive cost of such programs is higher.
The MOP sphere (left) is relatively extensive. It encompasses all policies whose starting point is a specific objective
of a technological type (explore Mars or develop new batteries), an industrial type (develop a new industrial
specialization, modernize a traditional sector, or generate a high-tech sector), a social type (eradicate malaria or com-
bat obesity), or an ecological type. All these objectives involve, by definition, the principles of non-neutrality (prefer-
ential intervention) direction (predetermination of domain) and the adoption of a systems approach. S3s, as a policy
aimed at generating new so-called transformative activities within a region (Section 1), form an integral part of this
MOP sphere, as they are essentially determined by these principles of non-neutrality, direction, and systems
approach.
These principles of non-neutrality and direction, as well as the systemic vision that must be adopted, obviously
impose substantial constraints and challenges in terms of policy design and policy governance, particularly to
minimize the risks inherent to these principles. Our next sections are to a great extent devoted to these questions that
have been posed in the case of S3.
2.1 From “old” to “new” types of missions
The MOPs that are crucial now, while posing unprecedented design and implementation problems, are not those
aimed at inventing a new technological object or crossing a particular line regarding exploration or discovery. Those
policies are as old as the hills and although they are a means of confronting the greatest technological challenges,
they do not pose very complex problems in terms of institutions, incentives, and organizations. Likewise sectoral pol-
icies aimed for example at maintaining a sector regarded as being strategic can also not be considered new. We will
leave all that aside. The policies that are really new and do pose unprecedented problems concerning design and im-
plementation are those that focus on the development of new activities targeting the transformation of economic or
technological structures—whether these activities are intended to address a grand challenge (like climate change), or
are aimed at developing a high-tech sector (ICT) or enabling a region to create new “specializations” (smart
specialization).
Innovation 
policy 
Non-neutral  Neutral 
Direction Rate  Rate 
MOP: preferential 
intervention according 
to certain objectives 
in techno, social, 
industrial domains 
Cross-sectional 
preferential intervention  
– concerning a particular 
class of actors (SMEs, 
start-ups) or particular 
stage (R&D) of the 
innovation process  
Interventions on 
generic capacities that 
compose the general 
innovation system  
Framework conditions  
Figure 1. A taxonomy of innovation policy based on a resource allocation framework.
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Within this more limited framework of analysis, the expression “capacity to implement a mission-oriented poli-
cy” covers not only centralized strategic decision-making, governance, and evaluation capabilities. It particularly
concerns the fact of being able to reconcile a logic of strategic choice, selection, and establishment of priorities with a
logic of decentralized and entrepreneurial information and initiatives. It is this conciliation between two logics, in the
past too often seen as contradictory, that today forms the basis of what we will call the new MOPs—of which S3 is
one. Achieving this conciliation is however a delicate undertaking—entailing the invention of a policy design based
on concepts such as level of granularity (at which priorities are established), entrepreneurial discovery, or
flexibility—and necessitating relatively new institutional and organizational forms (at least in the case of regional
policies) to put this design into practice.
3. S3 as part of a new class of policy programs
The regional innovation system approach was of course a valuable development, recognizing the need to build an
institutional framework for innovation at a regional level, but this approach remained largely neutral and undifferen-
tiated regarding regions’ specificities (right sphere in Figure 1 above). There were naturally exceptions, but sector-
neutral policy was the main logic underlying resource allocation in the framework of regional and cohesion policy.
S3 has a very different logic. It is non-neutral and focuses on the direction of innovation. A major difference vis-a`-
vis the traditional regional policies is a higher degree of intentionality, centralization, prioritization, and commitment
to new “specialization.”
As such, S3 as well as other policies involving choices and preferential interventions have been seriously criticized.
There are four main critical arguments that are important to consider. All these skeptical views about S3 and other
MOPs merit attention because they will contribute toward designing a policy process to minimize the problems iden-
tified below.5
The first kind of skepticism is the classic Chicago concern about distortions: “Although it is certainly true that not
everything can be done at once, focus on selected areas for large investments to the neglect of the rest of the economy
is a highly questionable strategy. Why it would be preferable to allocate scarce capital so that some activities have ex-
cellent infrastructures while others must manage with seriously deficient structure is not clear: without further evi-
dence, it would appear to be a distortion.” Krueger (2012) comments here on the works of Justin Yfu Lin, a great
promoter of the new structural economics framework. She would have plausibly expressed the same objections to
smart specialization policy. Ann Krueger is part of this large group of economists who recognize theoretically the ex-
istence of market failures (as a necessary antidote to the formal theory of general competitive equilibrium; Winter,
2017), but strongly argues that these market failures are not sufficiently serious to warrant governmental interven-
tion and, in particular, preferential policies that discriminate across activities.
The second kind of skepticism deals with a particular case of distortion, generated by a systematic allocative bias
in favor of the high-tech sector. Policies aimed at promoting rocket science and high-tech entrepreneurship will
possibly have an inclusive effect in the long term thanks to the habitual macroeconomic sequences—as described for
instance by Phelps (2006) —or because of the potential effects of innovation on social mobility so well described by
Aghion (2016). However, generally speaking, such positive effects on inclusion will only be realized in the long term,
whereas in the short term, such policies are essentially discriminating and exclusive and will to a great extent benefit
talented students from a few of the best campuses—assisted and supervised by very selective financial actors. Based
on a high-tech policy only, entrepreneurial activities are going to be stimulated and this will be beneficial to a small
part of the regional economy—a few indicators will improve and not the least important ones (patent, Venture
Capital (VC) attractions, and highly skilled jobs)—but the inclusion effect will be negligible and the gap between the
dynamic part and the non-dynamic part of the economy will increase.
The third kind of skepticism deals with government capabilities to understand and fix coordination failures that
are specific to each sector or technology. As well argued by Matsuyama (1997), “Understanding the basic principles
of coordination problems does not take one very far in the direction of useful, practical conclusions about how to
5 We do not mention here the classic and somewhat generic problem that is about project or research area selection (to
minimize the risk of supporting projects that would have been undertaken anyway, turning the policy into a simple mech-
anism of transfer of funding from the public to the private sector, without any additional effect. Indeed this problem
applies both to neutral and non-neutral policies). See Stiglitz and Wallsten (1999).
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construct technology policy. Understanding the basic problems, one is led to a new but not simpler set of questions:
What activities in what firms are complementary and need to be coordinated and in what way? An appropriate
choice of policy tools requires a detailed understanding of the externalities and the innovative complementarities
involved.” This is obviously a relevant comment but should it be taken as an argument to stop any policy interven-
tion aimed at addressing specific capabilities and specific infrastructures to support the formation of a specific trans-
formative activity (Aghion et al., 2009)?
The fourth skeptical view is that any pretext given to the government for setting priorities and establishing stra-
tegic targets increases the risk that the whole policy will become a central planning exercise based on a principal–
agent governance and resulting in very poor information flows from the bottom. Rodrik (2013) puts the argument
very well: “The agency framework assumes that the principals already have a very good idea of what needs to be
done to achieve public goals, and all that needs to be done is to provide the agents (firms) with the right incentives to
carry out the requisite investments.” However, to be fair, Rodrik is not using it against industrial policy but as an ar-
gument in favor of a new industrial policy design.
The fifth skeptical view can be applied to any policy logic—non-neutral and neutral alike. However, the problem
identified is likely to be amplified in the case of a policy involving preferential interventions. This is Romer’s argu-
ment: it is not enough to increase spending on R&D but what needs to be supported is the total quantity of inputs
that go into R&D: “In fact, any generous subsidies will fail in adding more R&D if the supply curve of human capital
is fixed and was not adjusted through early training programmes. In such case the increase of demand for R&D
induced by policy will translate into a proportional increase in wages for R&D scientists with no increase in the level
of R&D activities” (Romer, 2000). Romer rightly emphasizes here the importance of a correct sequencing of policy
programs. But whereas this problem of equating human capital with an increase in the demand for R&D can be atte-
nuated within the framework of a neutral policy by reallocating jobs between industrial sectors, it will be far more
difficult if the increased demand for R&D caused by the policy concerns a specialized domain.
Responses to these skeptical arguments can be provided at two levels: at an abstract level at which a policy design
is elaborated and at a more practical level at which institutional conditions for design implementation are discussed.
4. Policy design
Responding to these skeptical arguments by formulating a policy design appropriate to MOPs is crucially important.
The literature in this domain is not very well developed however. There are works that provide certain indications in-
directly by studying historical cases of MOPs in different sectors, from which certain good (and bad) practices can be
deduced (Mowery and Simcoe, 2002; Henderson and Newell, 2010; Jaffe, 2011; Mazzucato, 2011; Foray, et al.,
2012). There is also the still small number of works that identify from an econometric point of view certain success
factors of sectoral industrial policies—for example, the nature of competition in the targeted sector (Aghion, 2016).
And there are also the works dealing with the design of particular instruments, which can possibly be used within the
framework of MOPs (Kremer and Williams, 2009; Murray et al., 2012). Finally we must recognize the very signifi-
cant contribution made by Rodrik and a few others (Sabel and Haussman) who have gone furthest in the analysis of
appropriate policy designs as far as industrial policies in development economics are concerned.
In comparison with all these works, our contribution on the search for an appropriate policy design for S3 is ori-
ginal even if significantly inspired by the works of Rodrik. It identifies the three major problems that any targeting
and strategic policy prioritization is likely to encounter and that are the source of the different kinds of skepticism
mentioned earlier:
how to go about establishing priorities,
how to develop transformative activity within the framework of the established priority, and
what are the implications of a policy that is by its very nature experimental,
and suggests solutions and principles of policy design—based on the literature that we have briefly alluded to and
the detailed and meticulous observation of the trials and errors experienced in the context of the setting up of S3.
It must be noted that there is no one precise design component responding to one particular skeptical argument.
We think that it is rather the design as a whole, based on various principles such as the concepts of transformative ac-
tivity, granularity, entrepreneurial discovery, and flexibility, which should be considered to address the various
criticisms mentioned earlier.
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4.1 Establishing priorities
Regardless of the type of MOP, strategic priorities and choices must be established. This is the rule for a non-neutral
policy. How can this process be made as innocuous as possible, which means in particular minimizing policy capture
problems and avoiding the monopolization of resources by a small number of motivated actors? There are two prin-
ciples that seem to us to be important.
First, the level of granularity: the selection of priorities must be carried out not at a sector level but at the level of
activities that transform these sectors or establish new ones. This level—known as transformative activities—is thus
one of intermediate granularity, finer grained than sectors but coarser grained than individual entities. For example,
a “correct” priority should not be the footwear industry as a sector but rather the development of flexible manufac-
turing technologies for the footwear industry, should not be agro-food but the development of nano-applications to
increase quality in agro-food, should not be energy but the development of smart materials for the renewable energy
sector, etc. This is the level that best reveals the domains in which a region should position itself. This intermediate
level of aggregation also allows the defining of priority domains that are not too extensive. In an area that is too
broad—one designated “energy” for example—the 12 or 15 projects that are selected and supported are scattered
and dispersed. Connections, synergies, and spillovers will hardly happen and critical mass will not emerge. In a nar-
rower priority area, the same number of projects will be more connected, providing potential scale, scope, and spill-
over effects. Some platforms will be “general-purpose” and the markets for specialized inputs (skills and services)
will become thick. There is, of course, a political rationale underlying the need for broad areas (the so-called “coffee
for all”), but this is not the right way to proceed because, at the end of the day, the region will not get what an S3 is
supposed to deliver.
Second, intensive interactions between public and private sectors created within the framework of a robust and
transparent process: the identification of transformative activities is based on a process of interactions and dialogue
between the government, public sector, and private sector, backed up by evidence concerning the regional economy
and knowledge concerning the region’s entrepreneurial activities and capacities. There is no magic solution to avoid
problems of policy capture by “regulars” and those with the most influence. In the context of S3, it is a question of
setting up a decentralized and transparent process to identify the desired structural changes, the transformative activ-
ities that could lead to them, and the capacities and potentials that enable the selected activities to be initiated in a
credible manner. All of this contributes to the selection of a small number of unique combinations between existing
capacities and new opportunities for transforming regional structures.
4.2 Developing a transformative activity
Once a priority (a transformative activity) has been identified, the standard modus operandi for policy is to deploy
all sorts of policy instruments to support the exploration of the new area of opportunities and provide the specific
public goods that are needed (training, basic research, and services) as well as coordination devices to assist the for-
mation of networks and partnerships. There is nothing new here: R&D and human capital policy tools as well as
cluster policy tools can be deployed, but there is an important qualification: these tools address the specific develop-
ment of a quite narrowly defined activity aimed at a particular structural transformation. Three design principles
must be respected:
First, consideration of the complementarities between human capital and demand for R&D—a principle that dir-
ectly resolves Romer’s problem—spending more on formal R&D may end up inflating wages of R&D personnel and
not producing more innovation—and thus focuses on the correct sequencing of the policy: the formation of
specialized human capital and capabilities should precede, or at least occur at the same time as, the programs aimed
at increasing the demand for R&D in the specialized domain in question.
Second, an integrated vision of the transformative activity that must not focus only on the high-tech dimension of
the structural change sought. The activity must also integrate actions that allow the adoption of high tech by the sec-
tor that will be a potential user. Thus, for example, a transformative activity that concerns a certain number of scien-
tific innovation projects for agriculture must also include the actions (adoptions, training, and management) that will
facilitate the adoption of high tech by the traditional sector. If this is not done, the activity will remain limited to
start-ups and will lose its truly transformative nature. This principle is important if we want to respond to the objec-
tion regarding the increase in the gap between dynamic and non-dynamic sectors of the economy and succeed in mak-
ing this policy reconcile dynamism or vitality and inclusion.
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Third, how can we be sure that supporting the development of transformative activity will not result in a piling
up of useless instruments that are poorly coordinated and ultimately costly? Respecting the previously mentioned de-
sign principles—for example, the integrated vision of a priority that involves supporting not only breakthrough inno-
vations but also the management and absorption capacities of sectors that are potential users—is likely to produce an
over-elaborate policy. A design principle is essential here. It is the one known as the Tinbergen assignment theorem
that provides at least first-order guidance on the “number” of instruments or programs that need to be deployed
according to the goals or targets. The number of externalities or market failures should determine the number of
instruments (Jaffe et al., 2004). If we again take the transformation of the agri-food sector, there is a need for instru-
ments to support research and start-ups (because of knowledge externalities as well as capital market imperfections)
and instruments to support adoption in the traditional sector (because of adoption and network externalities as well
as training externalities). Finally, coordination failures can happen at the interface between the high-tech and trad-
itional sectors, and this would also need to be fixed through other instruments (e.g., a platform of specialized services
to support transfer of technologies). All in all the support of the transformative activity in this special S3 case should
therefore involve about five instruments to be implemented in a coordinated way. And it is because skeptical argu-
ment n3 is pertinent—how can the government manage such complexity—that the latter must choose and determine
a small number of transformative activities that must be supported. “Doomed to choose,” Hausmann and Rodrik
(2006) tell us.
4.3 Experimental policy
MOPs have an experimental nature. The objectives targeted represent, by definition, experiments; some will work
and some will not. We can clearly see the difference in relation to a neutral policy applying a relatively well-managed
instrument and whose “treatment effect” is known—for example, an R&D tax credit available to all companies
involved in R&D. We see that the political risk in this case is low. In view of past experiments and well-managed
evaluation methods, we can bet that this policy will be effective in most contexts (i.e., it will lead to an increase in re-
search efforts). It is of course a case appreciated by politicians and policymakers. In the case of a non-neutral policy
where the objective is the development of a certain transformative activity, the experiment is much more risky. Each
one of the transformative activities initiated is a gamble. These risks imply certain design principles.
First, entrepreneurial discovery: the application of this principle fundamentally reflects the experimental nature of
each transformative activity. As concrete exploration and coordination actions advance (projects, partnership, plat-
form, and training), entrepreneurial discovery operates at two levels—projects (success and failure) and the trans-
formative activity in its entirety—is it growing; will it lead to the hoped structural change? The centrality of
entrepreneurial discovery in the development of a transformative activity stems from the fact that initially there is no
complete knowledge regarding the way in which the process of the emergence and development of this activity is
going to unfold. It is as R&D investments, projects, and coordination actions develop that the potential of the trans-
formative activity and the probabilities of success of the different projects and actions will be revealed. Unlike in the
case of a neutral policy, one cannot apply here the standard principal–agent logic that supposes that the government
has sufficient information to construct a plan and provide the incentives necessary for firms to carry it out. “What if,
as I and many others assume, there are no principals . . . with the robust and panoramic knowledge needed for this
directive role?” (Sabel, 2004: 3). The fundamental point here is the Hayeckian argument that the knowledge about
what to do is not readily apparent. It is knowledge “of time and place” whose emergence cannot be planned in ad-
vance. The ex-ante knowledge is incomplete. We talk of entrepreneurial discovery (Kirzner, 1997), as this term com-
prises a crucial learning dimension regarding the real possibilities of development and structural effect offered by the
transformative activities. There are successes, failures, and surprises. Integration of the entrepreneurial discovery con-
cept in an industrial policy design was first achieved by Hausmann and Rodrik (2002). This represents an essential
step forward in enabling MOPs to avoid the tragedy of centralized planning, in other words reconciling a logic of
strategic choice and priorities with a logic of decentralized and entrepreneurial information and initiatives.
The development of the transformative activity should thus be informed by a discovery process regarding oppor-
tunities, constraints, and challenges. As such, the process of entrepreneurial discovery is characterized by a strong
learning dimension.
Second, flexibility: the transformative activities thus identified must not be seen as unalterable structures but ra-
ther as pioneering ventures and experiments. The flexibility of the strategy is therefore a requirement. What is learned
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thanks to the entrepreneurial discovery must exert a retroactive effect on the characteristics of the programs within
each transformative activity and also on the activities themselves to modify or possibly discontinue them. Moreover,
new combinations can emerge at any time and must be integrated in the form of new priorities. The flexibility of the
strategy imposes control and evaluation mechanisms that are essential for the conducting of the strategy. Monitoring
is a key element and any transformative activity needs to be measured to understand performance, the degree of pro-
gress, the direction and magnitude of changes, as well as potential failures and structural deficiencies and to indicate
that some issues warrant further investigation. One key feature of such indicators is to provide an up-to-the-minute
barometer of the activity that can be used for immediate feedback and adjustment of the policy (Feldman et al.,
2016).6
Third, maximization of spillovers. The social value of a process of entrepreneurial discovery is that it informs the
whole system about new opportunities, potential success, and failures; i.e., what are the directions of R&D and in-
novation that are likely to generate the desirable structural changes. The maximization of informational spillovers
created by the discovery phase is a key design principle that distinguishes entrepreneurial discoveries supported by a
public policy, as is the case here, from those made privately within firms that will tend not to diffuse this information.
Companies—most often large companies—can internalize the process of entrepreneurial discovery. They are looking
for new strategic domains and ways to explore them concretely. However, the difference between a process of entre-
preneurial discovery internalized in a company and a process of entrepreneurial discovery embedded in a public pol-
icy is obvious. In the former case, the social value of the process will be lower than in the latter.
When the entrepreneurial discovery process is supported by a public policy, it is critical that the informational
value of the process be maximized. The companies that are supported in joining the entrepreneurial discovery process
must accept and conform to these rules of information and audit. This creates a design issue: the reward for the entre-
preneurial discovery should be structured in a way that maximizes the spillovers to the other participants and poten-
tial entrants in the transformative activity (Rodrik, 2004).
4.4 The general nature of the policy design
This policy based on such design principles is neither purely bottom-up (because at some points priorities are chosen
by the government) nor totally top-down (because a few design principles—entrepreneurial discovery process and
public–private interactions—introduce a strong bottom-up component). It is rather an intermediate process aiming
to enhance entrepreneurial coordination within a framework (a small number of priority areas and transformative
activities) structured by the government.
By means of the still very abstract table that summarizes this section, we wish to highlight in the last section some
ways of implementing these principles that we find interesting, as they contribute to conveying an optimistic vision of
the capacities of governments and agencies to elaborate an MOP—in this case an S3 (Table 1).
5. From abstract policy design to institutions and practices
What is described earlier involves the findings of a somewhat abstract policy research. But the concretization of these
findings in a specific socioeconomic and political context is particularly demanding in terms of policymaking capabil-
ity and monitoring competences. S3s will not succeed if policymaking capabilities at a regional level do not reach a
high level of competence and commitment. This is no surprise: S3 is part of the so-called new industrial policy family
that aims at designing and deploying a rather sophisticated approach to make compatible vertical choices for re-
source allocation and decentralized market dynamics. Certain key authors are addressing this issue critically (see in
particular, Morgan, 2013, 2016).
It is totally obvious that a poor quality of government constitutes a serious barrier to the formulation and applica-
tion of S3 (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2014). Of course the aggregate measures of governmental quality tend to convey a
6 Rammer’s recent works provide a good basis for the development of subsidy mechanisms for R&D projects allowing a
certain flexibility in the allocation of resources: instead of one single financing decision, made at the start of the project,
Rammer elaborates a multiple and sequential decision model that allows projects that are not working to be interrupted
sooner and the volume of financing allocated to those that are progressing to be increased (Rammer and Klingebiel,
2012).
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somewhat pessimistic vision (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2014) and well-documented studies, for example, concerning
Central European and East European regions, highlight all the institutional deficits and capacity deficits that penalize
the implementation of S3 (Karo et al., 2017). We can also however identify a certain number of regional accomplish-
ments, undertaken in the spirit of policy design presented earlier, and that express the capacity of regional institutions
to design and implement mission-oriented programs.
Thus, the identification and selection of priorities and transformative activities has in most European regions
given rise to exemplary processes of interactions between the public and private sectors, prepared by the elaboration
of a systematic knowledge base concerning economic structures, innovation capacities, and entrepreneurial resources.
Thanks to this base, activities linking existing capacities and new opportunities are identified and selected. There are
numerous examples of regions that for the first time have set up public–private forums and relatively transparent
processes for establishing priorities. One fundamental result is that the very process of designing a strategy has gener-
ated beneficial effects resulting from the commitment of regions to the policy process. For instance, regions know
themselves better today than before because self-assessment and evaluation of potentials and capacities were required
(Kroll, 2016).
The development of transformative activities has in certain regions shown a capacity to comply with the correct
sequences (training and R&D) and have an integrated vision combining high-tech objectives and diffusion objectives
in the traditional sector. Therefore, in the case of the Basque Country (Spain), the transformative activity focusing on
the digitalization of traditional mechanical industries includes programs dealing with training, R&D, the adoption of
new technologies, the coordination of services (platform), and finally the setting up of international partnerships
(Navarro et al., 2011).
In the case of Lombardy (Italy), the transformative activity focusing on innovations in agriculture has integrated a
collection of actions to support the absorption and adoption of new knowledge and technologies offered by start-
ups. We have already mentioned this example in the previous section. The point here—if we again take the agricul-
ture case—is to involve the agri-food sector as a huge reservoir of potential adopters of these new technologies. The
goal is therefore twofold: encourage young innovative firms by equipping their ecosystem with all the necessary capa-
bilities and address the innovational complementarities between the high-tech and traditional sectors. The latter goal
involves addressing human capital and capability problems, fixing the adoption externalities, addressing coordin-
ation failures, and providing some specific public goods; in other words, it will address many barriers and obstacles
to innovation diffusion in a traditional sector. The choice for the Lombardy region was therefore between helping a
few nice guys with brilliant ideas or undertaking the proper actions to support the development of a real transforma-
tive activity, which would be likely to drive structural changes—not only in the high-tech but also in the huge agri-
food sector (Foray, 2017).
Recognition of the experimental nature of the MOP is without doubt the most difficult problem and its implica-
tions (entrepreneurial discovery, flexibility, and information dissemination) are still little understood or appreciated
Table 1. Main design principles for a Mission-Oriented Policy
Generic problems Design principles
Establishing priorities (non-neutrality and directionality
in resource allocation)
Level of granularity
Public–private interactions—transparency
Developing a transformative activity (system approach)
Human capital—demand for R&D sequence
Integrated vision—vitality and inclusion—innovation and diffusion
Tinbergen assignment
Recognizing and implementing the implications of an
experimental policy (governance)
Entrepreneurial discovery
Flexibility and monitoring
Maximization of spillovers
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by policymakers. Of course the expression “entrepreneurial discovery” has become standard in European regions
and European Union (EU) bodies, but this is more a matter of rhetoric than substance. What does this involve in con-
crete terms? Providing firms with incentives to explore the new opportunities, without dictating to them the content
or direction of their projects, provided that these projects fall within the framework of the transformative activity in
question; continuously evaluating progress, blockages, and surprises; ensuring the diffusion of information to the in-
dustrial base concerned; and reacting to the entrepreneurial discovery process by making decisions regarding the con-
tinuity or interruption of projects (according to Rammer’s logic of flexibility, footnote 5). We see these principles
being put into place in certain regions. Morgan (2016) describes for example the creation of “new ‘entrepreneurial
discovery spaces’ where public and private partners can explore and monitor projects of mutual interest.” He
observes this in the case of the Basque Country; we have also observed it in many other regions.
Thus, new practices and institutions are emerging, confirming the formation of new capacities at government and
agency levels to design and implement an S3-type MOP. The basic problem—that of introducing decentralized infor-
mation and entrepreneurial processes within a policy that determines targets and objectives in a centralized man-
ner—seems to have been relatively well resolved in many cases. In the most advanced regions and those with a rich
tradition of industrial policy, we can assume that regional government capacities are equal to the demands of policy
design and that any problems encountered originate more from historical conditions regarding the setting up of S37
than from the government’s level of capacity. In the case of intermediary regions, we notice that certain actors are
called upon to play a central role, especially the technological universities or engineering departments of universities.
In the favorable case where these departments play a historical role of knowledge transfer and collaboration with in-
dustry, they can play a central role in the development of the transformative activity (coordination, training, and re-
search) and the development of an experimental culture (entrepreneurial discovery, spillovers, and flexibility). We
have examples where nothing would be possible without the priceless contribution of university R&D laboratories.
We then observe a logic of co-specialization whereby the university both influences and takes into consideration the
region’s transformative activities to choose its research orientations (Bonaccorsi, 2016). This is the case for example
of Franche-Comte´ (France).
6. Conclusion
This article has developed the case of S3, recently adopted and implemented in Europe as part of the EU’s cohesion
policies, to examine the way in which an MOP and the complex policy design that it implies have been designed and
put into practice by the regions concerned. This practical application implies new structures, a new culture, and new
mechanisms on the part of government agencies that we consider must be fundamentally associated with these new
types of mission policy.
The establishment of priorities (according to the analysis of the desired structural changes, the comparison be-
tween existing capacities and opportunities, and the identification of the correct level of granularity), the develop-
ment of transformative activities corresponding to these priorities (which involves the deployment of various
instruments to respond to the different obstacles and difficulties, observing the right sequences, and integrating in-
novation and diffusion), and finally recognition of the experimental dimension of this policy (entrepreneurial discov-
ery, flexibility and monitoring, and spillovers) all represent challenges that must encourage public agencies to invent
new structures and change their political practices and culture.
Numerous cases show that the interim assessment is not negative. Many regions have been able to adapt or trans-
form their policy process to respond to some of these challenges. A new policy mind-set is slowly being instilled into
policymakers—comprising prioritization and vertical choice instead of neutral and horizontal programs;
decentralization, self-discovery, and flexibility rather than central planning; and transformative activities rather than
sectoral priorities. It seems to us that it is an important message in view of the resurgence of these new mission-
oriented and new industrial policies.
7 Remember that there has been no pilot phase or trial period—each region had to suddenly implement a policy that was
in many ways new to everyone—governments and experts alike.
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